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A Great and Profitable Clause: Why the New York City Bar 
Association Says It Is Time To Pay Attention to Investors Behind the 
Curtain* 
Litigation finance has rapidly evolved into a contemporary form that has become 
a multi-billion-dollar business in the United States. The rise of commercial 
litigation funding has led to the creation of finance firms with the specific intent 
to generate extreme profits from the American legal system. As the practice 
continues to experience exponential growth, it is increasingly important to ensure 
there are sufficient controls over the industry. Though there is currently little to 
no regulatory oversight, the American Bar Association’s Model Code of 
Responsibility suggests that the rule prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and 
nonlawyers should limit litigation finance arrangements that utilize contingent 
funding agreements. This Comment explores that suggestion and seeks to 
introduce other regulatory considerations through an analysis of an advisory 
opinion issued by the New York City Bar Association.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, one hundred years of ethical standards have shaped 
fee sharing arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers.1 Under the 
American Bar Association’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the general 
standard demands that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with . . . 
[nonlawyers].”2 In other words, lawyers are prohibited from splitting client fees 
with anyone who is not a lawyer, such as a lender or financier.3 Presently, all 
fifty states have adopted similar provisions.4 The purpose of this rule is to 
ensure that lawyers are not tempted to act under the guise of client interest 
when their motivations have actually been improperly influenced by fee sharing 
arrangements.5 Thus, the question becomes: What constitutes the undue 
influence that can ultimately create an impermissible fee sharing arrangement? 
Over the last decade, commercial litigation funding6 has expanded to the 
United States after its overseas growth in Australia and the United Kingdom.7 
As this contemporary investment practice has continued to rapidly expand, so 
too have the concerns about the potential for a new age of undue influence 
controlling modern fee sharing arrangements. The New York City Bar 
 
 1. See generally ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908) (requiring lawyers to 
represent their clients with “undivided fidelity,” including limiting their ability to enter into 
subsequent arrangements). 
 2. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1980). 
 3. Throughout this Comment, “financiers” is used to refer to the third-party individuals who 
provide capital contributions to fund litigation. 
 4. All fifty states have a Rule of Professional Conduct specifying a degree of professional 
independence for lawyers. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019); N.C. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019); WIS. SUP. 
CT. R. 20:5.4(a). 
 5. See generally N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 3 (2018) (“The 
purpose of the rule against fee sharing is to remove any incentive for nonlawyers to engage in 
undesirable behavior such as (1) interfering with a lawyer’s professional judgment in handling of a legal 
matter, (2) using dishonest or illegal methods . . . in order to win cases . . . or (3) encouraging or 
pressuring a lawyer to use such improper methods.” (quoting ROY D. SIMON & NICOLE HYLAND, 
SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 1420 (2017))). 
 6. Generally, commercial litigation funding arrangements involve investment commitments 
ranging from $500,000 to upwards of $20 million with the expectation of payouts exceeding $25 
million. STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 16 (2010). 
 7. See Damian Grave & Helen Mould, Litigation Funding on the Rise, HERBERT SMITH 
FREEHILLS (May 23, 2018), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/litigation-
funding-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/D25E-7Z24]. 
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Association (“NYCBA”) recently issued an advisory opinion that called for an 
examination of these influences and suggested expanding the definition of 
impermissible arrangements. The NYCBA stated that fee sharing is not 
permissible when the “lawyer’s future payments to the [litigation] funder are 
contingent on the lawyer’s receipt of legal fees or on the amount of legal fees 
received in one or more specific matters.”8 Although merely an advisory 
opinion, the NYCBA’s recent interpretation of its version of Rule 5.4(a)9 
spotlights a growing, potential ethical issue in today’s legal system.10  
This Comment describes the rise in litigation finance and analyzes how 
one bar association—the New York City Bar Association—has characterized 
this modern investment structure as an impermissible fee sharing arrangement 
due to the inherent ability of investors to influence litigation and the present 
lack of sufficient regulatory structures.11 
Analysis will proceed in four parts. Part I details the rise of litigation 
finance in the American legal system and the emergence of commercial 
litigation-finance firms. Part II examines the historical development of the 
professional responsibility standard for impermissible fee sharing. Part III 
describes why modern litigation financing should be considered an 
impermissible nonrecourse loan12 subject to fee sharing restrictions due to the 
inherent influence modern-day funders retain over the cases they finance and 
the lack of regulation of the industry. Finally, Part IV evaluates funders’ 
criticism of this interpretation and argues that such criticism overlooks the idea 
that investment analysts at these contemporary finance firms are former lawyers 
whose previous knowledge and experience provide the potential to manipulate 
litigation in the American legal system. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
In its most basic sense, litigation finance, or litigation funding, is a loan in 
which a third party provides financing in exchange for a share of any recovery 
earned from an underlying lawsuit.13 Litigation finance is not a new 
 
 8. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 1 (2018). 
 9. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019) (“Professional Independence of a 
Lawyer”). 
 10. Unless otherwise specified, this Comment primarily focuses on the New York City Bar 
Association’s analysis of the State of New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 11. See infra Part III.  
 12. Non-Recourse Loan, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/non-
recourse-loan.html [https://perma.cc/2VPD-LX5F] (defining “non-recourse loan” as a loan secured 
only by the collateral lent to the borrower which prevents the lender from holding the borrower 
personally liable upon default). 
 13. See John Freund, Everything You Ever Wanted To Know About Litigation Finance, LITIG. FIN. 
J. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://litigationfinancejournal.com/litfin101/everything-ever-wanted-know-
litigation-finance/ [https://perma.cc/9XUY-UEBW]. 
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phenomenon and is not inherently bad. In fact, the NYCBA specifically 
acknowledged that a traditional recourse loan14 is a completely valid form of a 
financing arrangement between a lawyer and nonlawyer.15 Issues arise when 
financing arrangements are structured with contingent repayment obligations 
based on the outcome of the underlying litigation. Thus, the purpose and 
structure of a loan determines whether a fee sharing arrangement is permissible. 
The evolution of litigation financing provides greater insight into the 
distinction between permissible and impermissible arrangements. 
A. The Beginning and Early Evolution 
The earliest recorded instance of litigation financing occurred during the 
sixth century B.C.E. in Athens, where third-party financiers intervened to help 
injured parties that could not effectively represent themselves against more 
powerful entities.16 Originally, the process was motivated by altruistic 
intentions to further the public welfare, but over time, abusive practices by 
private individuals corrupted this original intent.17 As legal financing began to 
spread to other civilizations, the practice expanded in scope. The rise of 
“calumniators”18 in Ancient Rome created disinterested litigation financiers 
analogous to modern-day third-party funders.19 In the Middle Ages, however, 
rule makers questioned the underlying iniquities of litigation finance and 
intervened. 
In medieval England, feudal lords began taking advantage of their ability 
to finance lawsuits. These lords would use their financial resources to sponsor 
lawsuits against their enemies with the hope of receiving an opportunity to gain 
joint ownership over land in dispute.20 If financiers were successful, they 
essentially achieved two victories. First, they obtained power through the 
acquisition of additional land interests; second, they stripped power from their 
adversaries. Because of this unfairness, the common law doctrines of barratry, 
maintenance, and champerty were formed, and these activities were deemed 
illegal.21 To understand these rules, a brief summary of important terminology 
used will help explain how these rules have changed over time. “Barratry is the 
 
 14. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 2 (“[A] traditional recourse 
loan requir[es] the lawyer to repay the loan at a fixed rate of interest without regard to the outcome of 
. . . any particular lawsuit or lawsuits.”). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 49 (1935). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. at 53 (defining “calumniator” as a person who brings an “unnecessary or baseless 
action[]” or a person “who without authorization bring[s an] action[]. . . with which they have no 
concern”). 
 19. See id. at 52 (describing the Romans’ takeover of third-party litigation financing). 
 20. See id. at 60. 
 21. See id. at 64–67. 
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vexatious incitement to litigation, especially by soliciting potential legal 
clients.”22 “[M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit” and “champerty 
is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome.”23 These 
doctrines became the basis for the present-day fee sharing rules.24 
Today, third-party funding of lawsuits has evolved into four distinct 
forms: (1) the client-funder arrangement, (2) the lawyer-funder fixed recourse 
loan, (3) the contingent fixed loan, and (4) the contingent sliding-scale loan. In 
its advisory opinion, the NYCBA found two of these forms—now commonplace 
in the modern legal scheme—to be permissible financing arrangements.25 First, 
the client-funder arrangement involves a structure where the funder contracts 
directly with the client, and the client agrees to pay the funder a percentage or 
set amount if the client wins his or her case.26 This approach is permissible 
because the lawyer and nonlawyer share no actual fees; the “Professional 
Independence of a Lawyer” rule is not implicated because the lawyer is not a 
party to the arrangement.27 The second common arrangement is the traditional 
recourse loan, which has also been established as a permissible form of fee 
sharing.28  
In contrast, the two fee sharing arrangements with repayment obligations 
contingent on a lawyer winning a case have been condemned as impermissible. 
The first—contingent fixed loan—sets a percentage or fixed fee “that the lawyer 
will pay . . . only if the lawyer receives legal fees in the matter.”29 The second—
contingent sliding-scale loan—is also dependent on the lawyer winning the case, 
but the amount to be paid is determined after the fact based on an undetermined 
amount.30 While litigation funding appears in multiple varieties, the underlying 
structure is usually based, to some degree, on one of these four methods. 
 
 22. Barratry, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 23. See Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 579 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 
412, 424–25 n.15 (1978)).  
 24. See Robert Barton & Wendy Walker, Alternative Litigation Finance, Part 2, 29 PROB. & PROP. 
50, 50–51 (2015). 
 25. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 2 (2018).  
 26. See id. at 1–2. 
 27. See id. at 2. 
 28. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (determining that the traditional recourse loan 
is the most commonly used permissible method of fee sharing today). 
 29. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 2. 
 30. See id. 
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B. Recent History 
Under the newest form of third-party litigation funding, financiers have 
expanded the practice to unprecedented levels.31 Today, funders use portfolio 
investments32 to mitigate risk and generate multi-million-dollar gains.33 
Financiers “back[] plaintiffs with individual cases as well as portfolios of cases 
being pursued by a single law firm.”34 While the practice began abroad,35 it has 
slowly become part of contemporary litigation practice in the United States. 
1.  Development in Australia 
Investment procedure in Australia has shaped the most recent form of 
litigation finance in the United States. In the mid-1990s, Australia passed 
legislation allowing “practitioners to enter into contracts to finance litigation 
characterized as company property,” setting the stage for the present-day 
financing of litigation.36 The legislation led to the creation of the first litigation-
finance firms, which originated with the specific intent of seeking out profitable 
lawsuits.37 Initially, the growth of litigation finance was relatively slow because 
funders were concerned about the parameters of the insolvency legislation and 
the ethical boundaries of litigation finance.38 In 2006, these concerns were cast 
aside when the “Australian High Court held that third-party litigation funding 
arrangements served a legitimate purpose in lawsuits and were not an abuse of 
process or contrary to public policy.”39 After the High Court legitimized these 
arrangements, the growth of litigation finance exploded.40 In 2015, third-party 
funding in Australia accounted for over $3 billion of the $21.1 billion litigation 
 
 31. See Lake Whillans, The History and Evolution of Litigation Finance, ABOVE L. (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/01/the-history-and-evolution-of-litigation-finance/?rf=1 
[https://perma.cc/3JVR-52UV]. 
 32. “A portfolio investment is a hands-off or passive investment of securities in a portfolio, and 
it is made with the expectation of earning a return.” James Chen, Portfolio Investment, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/portfolio-investment.asp [https://perma.cc/XC3T-SMS9]. 
 33. Sara Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job: Litigation Finance, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-hot-law-job-litigation-finance-1530783000 
[https://perma.cc/EF7Y-AND2 (dark archive)] [hereinafter Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job] 
(reporting that a $12.8 million investment resulted in a $107 million payout). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Whillans, supra note 31. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id.  
 39. See id. The case was Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd. [2006] 80 ALJR 1441, 
1462 (Austl.) (“The Abolition Act abolished the crimes, and the torts, of maintenance and champerty. 
By abolishing those crimes, and those torts, any wider rule of public policy . . . lost whatever narrow 
and insecure footing remained for such a rule.”).  
 40. See id. (“Today, nearly all major class actions in Australia are funded by private litigation 
finance companies.”). 
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market.41 Australia’s insurgence of this new-age funding was a significant 
contributing factor to the creation of litigation finance in the United States. 
2.  Development in the United Kingdom (UK) 
The UK’s implementation of funding arrangements was another key 
reason for the rise of third-party funding in the United States. Two specific 
events opened the door for litigation finance in the UK. First, the UK’s 
Criminal Law Act of 1967 decriminalized the “doctrines of maintenance,” which 
had prevented uninterested third-party individuals from prosecuting the case 
of another; and “champerty,” which was maintenance in expectation of a profit42 
that had previously prevented third-party funding arrangements.43 Second, 
Parliament enacted the Courts and Legal Services Act (“CLSA”).44 The CLSA 
paved the way for litigation funding by legalizing conditional fee agreements.45 
Although this legislation made it possible for litigation funding to begin, it was 
not until the late 1990s that the UK saw a proliferation of litigation-finance 
firms.46 
In 1999, litigation funding was not a prevalent practice in the UK. With 
the passage of the 1999 Access to Justice Act (“AJA”),47 there was an extensive 
increase in funding, as a central purpose of the AJA focused on expanding the 
scope of funding arrangements.48 Prior to the AJA, litigation funding was 
limited because the practice was confined to conditional fee agreements 
between a client and lawyer.49 The AJA sought to change this with three 
modifications. First, conditional fee agreements were endorsed between parties 
that were not subject to the lawyer-client relationship and consequently became 
the sole method for obtaining third-party funding in personal injury cases.50 
 
 41. Jason Geisker & Jenny Tallis, Litigation Funding in Australia: A Year of Review and Change?, 
CLAIMS FUNDING AUSTRL. (July 24, 2018), https://claimsfundingaus.com.au/news/litigation-
funding-australia-year-review-and-change [https://perma.cc/GW7S-PS6E]; Litigation Finance in the 
United States: How It Started, YIELDSTREET, https://www.yieldstreet.com/resources/article/litigation-
finance-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/AG9X-BFB9].  
 42. See supra note 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Criminal Law Act 1967, c. 58, § 14 (Eng.) (failing to change “any rule of law as to the 
cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal”); Whillans, 
supra note 31. 
 44. Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c. 41, § 58 (Eng.). 
 45. See id. (“A conditional fee agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by 
virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of its being a conditional fee 
agreement.”). 
 46. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, JOHN PEYSNER & ANGUS NURSE, LITIGATION FUNDING: 
STATUS AND ISSUES 18 (2012), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/litigation_funding
_here_1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VMR6-3CT8] (detailing how the 1999 AJA led to an increase in 
litigation funding by making the practice more accessible to the general public). 
 47. Access to Justice Act 1999, c. 22, §§ 27–28 (Eng.). 
 48. Whillans, supra note 31. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
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After the AJA was passed, litigants were no longer permitted to receive civil 
legal aid in an attempt to increase the use of fee sharing agreements in personal 
injury cases.51 Second, the UK’s “loser pays” policy52 was extended so that 
litigants could “pass . . . fees and insurance premiums associated with 
[conditional fee agreements] on to their opponents.”53 Finally, the AJA created 
a new type of insurance which sought to protect litigants from having to pay 
their opponents’ legal fees under the “loser pays” rule in the event that they lost 
their case.54 These changes led to a new age in litigation funding. 
These remolded fee sharing arrangements, paired with the newly 
established “after the event” insurance, created a unique situation.55 Petitioners 
were now able to find third-party funders to cover all of their cases and 
insurance companies to cover their losses.56 Thus, there was very little risk for 
petitioners, and lawyers had the possibility of reaping huge rewards. As if this 
was not enough to kickstart the litigation funding revolution, a 2002 opinion 
found third-party funding to be lawful and ethical in all situations except for 
when the funding was specifically meant to “undermine the ends of justice.”57 
Today, litigation funding in the UK has been referred to as a “feature of modern 
litigation.”58 The rise in third-party funding created an influx of specific 
litigation-finance firms, and these firms have ultimately expanded into the 
United States. 
3.  Progression to the United States 
It is difficult to find exact numbers or figures to explain the growth of 
litigation finance in the United States because the industry has never been 
regulated in a fashion comparable to Australia or the UK.59 However, the 
practice has been on the rise since the early 1990s,60 and the first litigation 
 
 51. See id. 
 52. Peter Karsten & Oliver Bateman, Detecting Good Public Policy Rationales for the American Rule: 
A Response to the Ill-Conceived Calls for Loser Pays Rules, 66 DUKE L.J. 729, 736 (2016) (establishing that 
“the ‘loser pays’ . . . rule may have begun in 1278” and directs defendants to pay costs to successful 
plaintiffs (citing Statute of Gloucester 1278, 6 Edw., c. 1)). 
 53. Whillans, supra note 31. 
 54. HODGES ET AL., supra note 46, at 18. 
 55. See id. (“[Because of the AJA] in 1999, . . . the full [conditional fee agreement] fee and [after-
the-event insurance] premium [became] recoverable from the defendant.”). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See R. (Factortame Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for Transp., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 932 (Eng.). 
 58. Excalibur Ventures v. Texas Keystone, [2016] EWCA (Civ) 1144 [1] (Eng.). 
 59. See Ronen Avraham & Anthony Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer 
Litigant Funding, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1139–40 (2019). 
 60. Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and a Proposal To 
Bring Litigation Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750, 753–
54 (2012). 
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financers were influenced by the success of the practice in those countries.61 In 
the early days, lenders led grassroots efforts all over the country, attempting to 
find deserving plaintiffs and generate promising returns.62 The first expansion 
efforts were often referred to as the “Wild West” period because there were few 
rules combined with many people seeking the lucrative cases.63 Perry Walton, 
sometimes called the “godfather” of American litigation finance, was one of the 
first funders to capitalize on this movement.64 Walton opened a second business 
where he loaned plaintiffs money for litigation as “contingent obligations” and 
also began leading seminars where he trained hundreds of people on how to find 
cases that would generate these returns.65 
By the mid-2000s, underhanded lending tactics raised ethical concerns 
about the process of funding litigation.66 In 2004, these concerns led to 
proactive self-regulation and the creation of the American Legal Finance 
Association with the purpose of “promoting fair, ethical, and transparent 
funding standards to protect legal funding consumers.”67 These proactive efforts 
marked a turn where the industry, through self-regulation, began to make small 
compromises or changes in order to stay ahead of legislative reform.68 However, 
this self-regulatory framework also prevented the industry from expanding too 
quickly.69 Over time, three periods of development have shaped modern 
litigation funding. 
First, the early days of litigation finance were controlled by individual 
investors funding single personal injury claims.70 As the industry evolved, the 
cases and stakes grew.71 The more prominent financiers began to focus on “one-
off tort suits” with possible payouts in the millions; as the payouts increased, 
institutional investors began to take notice, which ultimately led to the second 
large development—commercial litigation funding.72 Commercial litigation 
 
 61. See Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation 
Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 360 (2011). 
 62. Litigation Finance in the United States: How It Started, supra note 41. 
 63. See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be 
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 55 (2004). 
 64. Hashway, supra note 60, at 754 (“Walton made his first foray into extortionate lending with 
a business he named Wild West Funding.”). 
 65. See id. (approximating that Walton had trained over 400 people by the year 2000). 
 66. See id. at 768 (highlighting a court’s concern over the ability of litigation finance companies 
to victimize plaintiffs). 
 67. About ALFA, AM. LEGAL FIN. ASS’N, https://americanlegalfin.com/about-alfa/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZJ6-CCR6]. 
 68. See Hashway, supra note 60, at 774. 
 69. See Litigation Finance in the United States: How It Started, supra note 41.  
 70. Tara E. Nauful, Third-Party Litigation Financing: Do We Need It? Is It Worth the Risks?, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., May 2016, at 16. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
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funding73 was created as a result of the newfound interest in higher payouts.74 
By 2000, “large banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and insurance companies” 
were all funding litigation.75 This development led to a paradigm shift where 
institutional investors turned away from the one-off tort suits and began to 
focus on corporate commercial litigation.76 The final shift, which has led to a 
massive increase in litigation funding, was the establishment of the 
contemporary litigation-finance firms.77 Utilizing portfolio investing, these 
firms have been able to raise hundreds of millions of dollars from outside 
investors to generate massive returns with very little risk.78 
4.  Recent Explosion in the United States 
What started out as a modest practice has escalated quickly in recent 
years.79 Firms raise pools of funding, consisting of hundreds of millions of 
dollars, to invest in corporate litigation.80 Between 2013 and 2016, the number 
of lawyers who reported having used litigation finance in their practice is said 
to have increased by 400%.81 Originally, these firms funded cases in the same 
way that Perry Walton backed personal injury cases in the early 1990s.82 Firms 
raised money and made payments to corporations and other institutions to be 
used for individual cases. However, the practice evolved into its newest form 
 
 73. See id. (“In [consumer litigation funding], funders provide corporate plaintiffs with financing 
to pursue potentially lucrative—but costly—litigation without a corresponding risk to the company’s 
bottom line.”). 
 74. See id. 
 75. Litigation Finance in the United States: How It Started, supra note 41; Sara Randazzo, Litigation 
Financing Attracts New Set of Investors, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
litigation-financing-attracts-new-set-of-investors-1463348262?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/
BFS4-59SA (dark archive)] [hereinafter Randazzo, Litigation Financing] (“Pension funds, university 
endowments, family offices and others have collectively pumped more than a billion dollars into the 
sector in recent years.”).  
 76. See Nauful, supra note 70, at 16 (defining corporate litigation as an amount so significant it 
would negatively impact a “company’s bottom line”); Grave & Mould, supra note 7. 
 77. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1269, 1277 (2011).  
 78. Sara Randazzo, Investors Flock To Back Lawsuits in Exchange for a Cut of Settlements, WALL ST. 
J. (Sep. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-funder-longford-raises-500-million-as-
industry-surges-1505707261?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/2W4G-AF5V (dark archive)] 
[hereinafter Randazzo, Investors]. 
 79. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75 (detailing how one litigation-finance firm 
provided a single law firm over $100 million). 
 80. See Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party Investors Offer New Funding Source for Major Commercial 
Lawsuits, FULBROOK CAP. MGMT., LLC, (Mar. 5, 2010), http://fulbrookmanagement.com/third-
party-investors-offer-new-funding-source-for-major-commercial-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/LX5D-
35KN]. 
 81. See Joshua Hunt, What Litigation Finance Is Really About, NEW YORKER (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-litigation-finance-is-really-about 
[https://perma.cc/93Q7-ABE6].  
 82. See Steinitz, supra note 77, at 1277.  
98 N.C. L. REV. 973 (2020) 
2020] A GREAT & PROFITABLE CLAUSE 983 
where litigation-finance firms fund portfolios of cases within a specific 
institution or law firm.83 The shift from stand-alone investments to portfolio 
investments has expanded rapidly. In 2017, a leading litigation-finance firm 
invested “$726 [million] into portfolio deals, compared with [its] $72 [million 
investment] into stand-alone suits.”84 The newest form of litigation funding 
presents even less risk to investors while still maintaining the ability for firms 
specializing in litigation finance to secure massive rewards.85 
Over the last few years, roughly thirty new litigation-finance firms have 
opened their doors in the United States.86 During the same period, these new 
firms have raised over $2 billion to fund litigation with the intent of “packaging 
lawsuits into portfolios.”87 Because of the recent success, funders are raising 
more and more capital so that they can expand portfolios while generating 
quicker returns for their investors.88 This strategy offers two immense benefits 
for funders. First, it allows firms to mitigate risk because multimillion-dollar 
investments are no longer tied to the all-or-nothing investment format.89 
Instead, investors provide larger capital contributions to the law firm or 
institution to distribute among a variety of cases and, thus, maximize the chance 
to recoup their investments.90 Second, because funders are dispersing larger 
amounts of money, they are generating returns much more quickly, which has 
ultimately allowed them to raise capital at an unprecedented rate.91 
Lawyers are leaving top-paying legal jobs and flocking to coveted positions 
in litigation finance92 because of the extreme profits and the serious demand for 
knowledgeable employees.93 The newest litigation-finance firms are full of 
attorneys, many of whom are former partners at some of the most respected law 
firms in the country, such as Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Latham & 
 
 83. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75 (“Rather than betting on one-off lawsuits, 
today’s funders are scaling up and backing large portfolios of cases to deploy money faster and create 
more consistent returns for their own investors.”). 
 84. Appealing Returns: Litigation Finance Offers Investors Attractive Yields, ECONOMIST (Aug. 18, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/08/18/litigation-finance-offers-
investors-attractive-yields [https://perma.cc/5A2T-ZLSU].  
 85. Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78. 
 86. Appealing Returns: Litigation Finance Offers Investors Attractive Yields, supra note 84. 
 87. See id.; Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78. 
 88. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75. 
 89. Christopher P. Bogart, The Case for Litigation Financing, LITIG., Spring 2016, at 46, 48. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Thomas J. Salerno & Jordan A. Kroop, Third-Party Litigation Funding: Where Do We Go 
Now?, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2018, at 3. 
 92. Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33. 
 93. See id. The average expected return for every dollar invested is roughly $2.70 within thirty 
months. Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75. Likewise, in 2017, the largest litigation-finance 
firm in the industry experienced a 170% increase to their six-month profits. Randazzo, Investors, supra 
note 78 (finding also that Buford Capital earned $142.7 million in profit during the first half of 2017). 
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Watkins LLP; and Proskauer Rose LLP.94 Looking at the websites of the top 
litigation-finance firms, it is often difficult to determine whether one is looking 
at a law firm or an investment firm because so many employees are advertised 
in their respected legal capacities.95 These finance firms have been so successful 
at raising capital that they have had to turn away potential investors.96 The new 
influx in capital is giving firms the freedom to adapt and develop new, creative 
investment strategies within the industry.97 While some firms have used the 
newly acquired funds to expand their investment strategies through the 
development of boutique firms and the acquisition of new lawyers-turned-
investors, others have employed more unique methods, such as using a potential 
litigation proceeding to leverage an acquisition.98 Because of the recent growth 
in the industry, litigation-finance firms now have a freedom and opportunity to 
manipulate American litigation that they did not have in the past.99 
II.  HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL FEE-SHARING PROHIBITIONS 
The origin of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) implementing rules 
to protect against fee sharing can be traced back to the 1908 Canons of Professional 
Ethics.100 However, the basis for Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 3-102(A) dates back 
to the common law doctrines of barratry, maintenance, and champerty that were 
created in the Middle Ages to protect clients against interference from third 
parties who had a superior knowledge of the legal system.101 Although some 
scholars argue the original purposes of these doctrines may be antiquated,102 the 
 
 94. Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33. 
 95. See, e.g., Meet the IMF Bentham Team, United States, IMF BENTHAM, 
https://www.imf.com.au/about/meet-the-team [https://perma.cc/Y8R7-E2QZ] (listing “legal counsel” 
as an employee title for all United States employees but one); Search the Team, United States, BURFORD 
CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/directory/?location=1 [https://perma.cc/S3AV-VVJM] 
(advertising employees’ former legal titles and positions on the biographies home page). 
 96. See Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78 (“Longford [Capital Management LP] said it attracted 
enough interest from investors to raise $1 billion for the recently closed fund, . . . but decided to cap it 
at half that.”). 
 97. See Randazzo, Litigation Financing, supra note 75. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. While Disciplinary Rule 3-102(A) is the ABA’s first specific rule prohibiting fee sharing, the 
“undivided fidelity” required by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics is thought to be the first barrier 
to such arrangements. See infra text accompanying note 104; see also Edward S. Adams & John H. 
Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1998) (suggesting that, although the original Canons of Professional Ethics did not specifically 
account for “whether practicing lawyers could enter into business associations with nonlawyers,” the 
foundation for future developments was laid in 1908). 
 101. See Lyon, supra note 23, at 580. 
 102. Cf. id. at 579–80 (“[T]he evolution of the doctrines from the common law to the modern day 
. . . shows that they are out of step with our contemporary beliefs about litigation.”). 
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guiding principles maintain their roots in the present-day rule against fee 
sharing with nonlawyers.103 
As fee-sharing arrangements have progressed over the last century, 
lawyers have consistently been required to pledge fidelity to their clients by 
avoiding any “matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect 
to which confidence has been reposed.”104 The original Canon of Professional 
Ethics advised lawyers to avoid all undue influence from third parties and to 
remain impartially dedicated to their clients’ interests. With the adoption of 
Canon 34 two decades later, the ABA specifically prohibited fee sharing 
between a lawyer and a nonlawyer for the first time105 and thereby solidified the 
previous beliefs that such fee sharing would constitute an adverse client 
interest.106 In 1969, the ABA modified Canon 34 by adopting the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility and codifying DR 3-102(A).107 Today, the rule against 
fee sharing generally protects against three undesirable behaviors: “(1) 
interfering with a lawyer’s professional judgment in handling of a legal matter, 
(2) using dishonest or illegal methods . . . in order to win cases[,] . . . or (3) 
encouraging or pressuring a lawyer to use such improper methods.”108 The 
implicit influence associated with the first behavior seems to have been the most 
prevalent concern when the ABA created rules prohibiting fee-sharing 
arrangements; however, the explicit influence underlying the second and third 
behaviors has gained more attention in recent years. 
A. The Modern Standard for Prohibiting Fee Sharing 
When lawyers represent clients, they are bound by a fiduciary duty “of the 
highest degree;”109 therefore, lawyers must exercise their professional judgment 
solely on behalf of their clients.110 Today, the profession assumes fee sharing 
with a nonlawyer splits a lawyer’s interests and interferes with a lawyer’s 
professional judgment with regard to his or her clients.111 More specifically, 
 
 103. See 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty, Maintenance, and Barratry § 1, Westlaw (database updated 
Nov. 2019) (citing Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1110–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 104. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908). 
 105. See CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1928). 
 106. See Roy D. Simon, Jr., Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 YALE L.J. 
1069, 1079–80 (1989) (“[N]o division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, 
based upon a division of service or responsibility.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 34 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1928))). 
 107. See id. at 1082. 
 108. SIMON & HYLAND, supra note 5, at 1420. 
 109. See Lisa Miller, Perils of Third-Party Funding, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2017, at 19. 
 110. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of Delegates 4 
(Feb. 2012) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011)) 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_al
f_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV8S-PK6P (staff-uploaded 
archive]. 
 111. See id. at 29. 
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when bar associations attempt to protect against fee sharing, they seem to enact 
such policies under the belief that when a lawyer engages in fee sharing, he or 
she—either directly or indirectly—sacrifices some degree of judgment to ensure 
that his or her funders will recoup their investment.112 The current rules in the 
Rules of Professional Conduct pertaining to fee sharing are designed to protect a 
number of client interests,113 and a fee-sharing arrangement that results in a 
lawyer surrendering any portion of their earnings to a third party could 
potentially jeopardize those interests. 
Legal scholars have expanded on these concerns by highlighting situations 
where fee sharing with nonlawyers will do more harm than simply requiring a 
lawyer to sacrifice some level of judgment.114 In these situations, the fear is that 
these relationships with a third party incentivize lawyers to act dishonestly or 
even illegally. The concern over this more explicit manipulation is not 
unfounded. In Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp.,115 the Supreme 
Court of Ohio found that this type of manipulation had occurred when it held 
that a settlement offer presented to the client was beneficial to the client’s 
lawyer and financier but was detrimental to the client.116 A lawyer should not 
be influenced by a third party’s desire to impact a case because of “political, 
ideological, or personal beliefs.”117 In theory, fee sharing is supposed to create 
disinterested investors; in practice, the arrangements create extraneous 
relationships between lawyers and financiers that can supersede the 
relationships between clients and attorneys.118 
All fifty states have adopted or expanded the ABA’s DR 3-10(A) to 
provide a rule of conduct similar to New York’s Rule 5.4(a) stating that “[a] 
lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer.”119 While state 
bar associations have issued countless informal opinions commenting on the 
scope of impermissible fee sharing, ethics committees from only a few state bar 
associations have concentrated specifically on litigation funding.120 States 
 
 112. See id. at 22 (suggesting that the funder’s goal of maximizing their investment cannot be 
entirely isolated from the litigation proceeding). 
 113. See id. at 15 (stating that the rules are designed to protect a client’s “confidentiality of 
information . . .	, the reasonable expectation of loyalty of counsel, and the interest in receiving candid, 
unbiased advice”). 
 114. See, e.g., Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388, 401–
02 (2016) (indicating that undisclosed funding opens the door for “disastrous” manipulation). 
 115. 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003). 
 116. Id. at 220. 
 117. W. Bradley Wendel, Paying the Piper but Not Calling the Tune: Litigation Financing and 
Professional Independence, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1, 4 (2018). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2019) (“Professional Independence of a 
Lawyer”). This Comment specifically highlights New York’s rule of conduct because of its importance 
in Formal Opinion 2018-5 issued by the NYCBA. 
 120. See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 110, at 24–25. 
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disagree as to what constitutes impermissible fee sharing with regard to 
litigation funding under a contingent interest.121 Some states consider it to be a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a litigation funder to take a 
contingent interest in a case where the lawyer has a contingent fee agreement 
with the client.122 However, other states have been more lenient on this 
position.123 The NYCBA appears to be one of the first bar associations to focus 
on the magnitude of fee sharing stemming from modern litigation funding. Its 
recent opinion is an attempt to specifically interpret how the practice should be 
governed under the Rules of Professional Conduct.124 
B. The Progression of the Rule Against Fee Sharing in New York 
The New York State Bar Association has actively attempted to define the 
scope of impermissible fee-sharing arrangements under its rules. To date, the 
state bar association has deemed numerous activities impermissible under the 
prohibition against fee sharing. Such activities include client recruitment and 
the solicitation of services,125 determining marketing fees based on fees 
generated from individual clients,126 and crowdfunding or other fundraising 
activities.127 Furthermore, the NYCBA has expanded on the tenets underlying 
these bans by further prohibiting fee-sharing arrangements with nonlawyers 
who provide administrative services128 and for arrangements with a landlord for 
rental payments.129 The New York State Bar Association has made it clear that 
arrangements of these types are only impermissible when they are arranged 
under certain contingencies related to specific clients.130 For example, New York 
allows lawyers to pay for particular services.131 However, under Rule 5.4(a), a 
lawyer must consider two issues in order to ensure compensation agreements 
 
 121. See id. at 29. 
 122. See e.g., Va. State Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1764 (2002). 
 123. See Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. KBA E-432, at 7 (2011). 
 124. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018). 
 125. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 917, ¶ 4 (2012) (“[T]he law firm [can] 
not pay a bonus to an employee-marketer that is based on the referral or recommendation of specific 
clients.”). 
 126. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 992, ¶ 16 (2013) (“Payment of a percentage 
of firm profits for a specific matter is tantamount to fee sharing and is not permitted.”). 
 127. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1062, ¶ 17 (2015) (“Any form of 
fundraising that gives the investor an interest in a law firm or a share of its revenue would be 
prohibited.”). 
 128. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2015-1, at 6 (2015) (“[A]ny payment 
arrangement with a [professional employer organization] must be structured so it complies with the 
rule against fee-sharing.”) 
 129. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018) (“[A] lawyer may not 
agree to pay [a] landlord [with a] percentage of [the] firm’s revenues as office rent.” (citing N.Y. 
County Lawyers Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 697 (1993))). 
 130. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 992, ¶ 16. 
 131. See id. ¶ 10 (“[T]he lawyer may enter into an agreement to compensate the business owner 
for marketing or other services.”). 
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are permissible. First, nonlawyers may not be paid a “commission or percentage 
based upon the volume of business developed.”132 Second, a nonlawyer may only 
receive a percentage of a lawyer or law firm’s overall profits.133 Thus, it is 
considered impermissible fee sharing for a lawyer and nonlawyer to enter a 
compensation agreement based on fees earned from a specific client associated 
with the service provided by the nonlawyer.134 In its recent opinion on the 
subject, the NYCBA decided that funding a case on a contingent interest is 
essentially taking a percentage of an all-or-nothing stake in a client and should 
be considered impermissible.135 Thus, the litigation-finance practices employed 
by firms operating under the contemporary contingency standards should likely 
be considered impermissible under Rule 5.4(a). 
III.  WHY NON-RECOURSE INVESTMENT POOLING IS IMPERMISSIBLE 
Not all fee-sharing arrangements between a lawyer and nonlawyer are 
impermissible.136 Instead, issues arise when fee-sharing arrangements are 
structured in a way that the funder receives a contingent interest in the stakes 
of the litigation because there is no way to ensure that lawyers will remain loyal 
to their clients.137 According to the NYCBA in Formal Opinion 2018-5, the New 
York Rule of Professional Conduct prohibiting a lawyer (or law firm) from 
sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer138 “is equally applicable when the lawyer’s 
payment to the funder is based on the recovery of legal fees in multiple matters 
. . . as opposed to a single matter.”139 The NYCBA’s underlying theory is based 
on the central prohibition against fee sharing. When funders provide financing 
to a lawyer for more than one matter, the funder still retains the incentive to 
improperly influence and might even retain the ability to manipulate. In 
Opinion 2018-5, the NYCBA acknowledged that its interpretation of Rule 
5.4(a) could be considered overly expansive;140 however, it unequivocally 
determined that “[n]othing in the language, history or prior interpretations of 
Rule 5.4(a) supports an interpretation carving out litigation funding 
arrangements.”141 
 
 132. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 565, ¶ 9 (1984). 
 133. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 887, ¶ 11 (2011). 
 134. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 992, ¶ 14. 
 135. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5 (2018) (“A nonrecourse 
financing agreement secured by legal fees in a matter . . . constitutes an impermissible fee-sharing 
arrangement regardless of how the lawyer’s payments are calculated.”). 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 25–30. 
 137. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 5–6 (“[W]hen 
nonlawyers have a stake in legal fees from particular matters, they have an incentive or ability to 
improperly influence the lawyer.”). 
 138. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (2017). 
 139. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 5. 
 140. See id. at 6. 
 141. See id. 
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Opinion 2018-5 is important because it sheds light on how a rapidly 
growing component of the modern legal culture might actually be unethical and 
ultimately impermissible. Today, there are a few reasons to be concerned with 
the ability of litigation funders to exert improper influence on the cases they 
finance. One of the biggest concerns is that the modern system of litigation 
finance is dominated by former lawyers with a working knowledge of how to 
control the financed cases. The current litigation funding system is structured 
such that, technically, nonlawyers lend money to lawyers. However, because of 
funders’ previous experience in the legal field, the modern application of the 
rule might be more effective if the rule actually protected against outside 
lawyers lending to other lawyers. 
A. Influences Elicited by the Modern Investor 
Ethical standards and expertise are foundational barriers to becoming a 
lawyer. As American lawyer and legal scholar John Wigmore wrote, “The Law 
as a pursuit is not a trade. It is a profession. It ought to signify for its followers 
a mental and moral setting apart from the multitude,—a priesthood of 
Justice.”142 For decades, being a lawyer has been a revered career characterized 
by certain occupational expertise and status. Because of this, lawyers—or 
“litigation engineers”143—are expected to provide a specialized service unique 
to any other individual.144 When examining the potential variables and 
outcomes of a case, lawyers are “best able to assess [the] merits and probable 
outcome[s].”145 Thus, the current wave of litigation-finance firms, comprised of 
former lawyers with decades of experience, would appear to have an inherent 
advantage when investigating which cases to fund because these lawyers have 
insight into the effect that their investments might ultimately have on the 
funded litigation.146 
Although employees of these firms understand that they are not practicing 
law, there is no doubt that a thorough knowledge of the legal profession is seen 
as a decisive factor for being successful within the industry.147 The current 
landscape of litigation funding allows investors to use their unparalleled, 
 
 142. John H. Wigmore, Introduction to ORRIN N. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 
at xxi (1915). 
 143. See Radek Goral, Justice Dealers: The Ecosystem of American Litigation Finance, 21 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 98, 119 (2015). 
 144. See id. (“[Lawyers] put the facts together, evaluate them, and build a case for the represented 
client.”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33; see also infra note 150–54 and 
accompanying text. 
 147. See Randazzo, The New Hot Law Job, supra note 33 (“I understand I’m not going to be 
practicing law, but there’s nothing to stop me from being able to share my knowledge to help achieve 
a great result in these cases.”). 
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practical knowledge of the legal industry and apply their knowledge to an 
investment setting through the litigation proceedings of a third party.148 The 
results of the cases backed by modern funders are illustrative of the fact that 
former-lawyers-turned-investors are well versed in picking which cases will 
yield successful outcomes for their firms. For example, over the last decade, 
Longford Capital, a leading private investment company, has invested nearly 
$150 million into 102 separate lawsuits; of these cases, forty-three settled or 
were resolved without having to go to court, thus generating quick and efficient 
returns for the firm.149 While these figures do not support the causal inference 
that financiers are forcing settlements, the continued growth of litigation 
finance and the more than 40% settlement rate in the preceding	example, taken 
together, indicate a strong correlation between third-party funders and	 a 
propensity towards settlement. 
Presently, these nonpracticing attorneys spend their days combing 
through court records and soliciting legal contacts from their prior 
professions.150 However, because investors have very specific criteria for 
choosing cases, they select only a small number of cases to finance.151 Certain 
firms have even been able to code these specifications into algorithms that flag 
potential cases based on profitability factors, such as a specific law firm or the 
type of claim being filed.152 In a sense, these investors are using their expertise 
as lawyers to continuously search for cases that, if funded, will ultimately 
generate a favorable return from a settlement, judgment, or fee award.153 
Investors are acutely aware that third-party funding can impact litigation by 
actually “mak[ing] it harder and more expensive to settle cases.”154 Thus, when 
a third party finances a case, the actual act of funding the proceeding can have 
a determinative outcome on the result of the case—such as whether or not it 
will settle. This is ultimately a form of manipulation or, at the very least, some 
level of influence. 
Again, the purpose of the rule against fee sharing is to protect against “(1) 
interfering with a lawyer’s professional judgment in handling of a legal matter, 
 
 148. See Why Big Law Litigators Are Making the Move to the Litigation Finance Industry, BENTHAM 
IMF (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/2017/
09/06/why-big-law-litigators-are-making-the-move-to-the-litigation-finance-industry 
[https://perma.cc/2Y5G-N2LM]. 
 149. See Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78. 
 150. See Randazzo, The New Hot Job, supra note 33. 
 151. See Lindeman, supra note 80 (detailing the process and selectivity of choosing which cases to 
fund). 
 152. Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78 (suggesting that “creditworthiness of [a] defendant” is 
another factor that an algorithm might flag). 
 153. See Jacob Gershman, Lawsuit Funding, Long Hidden in the Shadows, Faces Calls for More Sunlight, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2018 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-funding-long-hidden-in-
the-shadows-faces-calls-for-more-sunlight-1521633600 [https://perma.cc/S93P-YC9V (dark archive)].  
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98 N.C. L. REV. 973 (2020) 
2020] A GREAT & PROFITABLE CLAUSE 991 
(2) using dishonest or illegal methods . . . in order to win cases . . . or (3) 
encouraging or pressuring a lawyer to use such improper methods.”155 It could 
easily be considered a dishonest or encouraging method to provide financing 
for a litigation proceeding with the understanding that the funds will elicit a 
certain outcome. This becomes even clearer when investors operate under the 
appearance of being uninvolved third-party investors but have the knowledge 
to understand and anticipate that their contributions will likely have a 
significant and profitable impact. 
B. Recent Attempts at Reformation 
The idea that litigation funders are able to manipulate the American 
litigation system through third-party financing is not new. In 2017, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce petitioned to change the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure regarding the disclosure of third-party financing arrangements.156 
The organization made the same requests in both 2014 and 2016 but was 
denied.157 The latest request was based on the idea that disclosure of the source 
of funding is necessary to ensure impartiality in light of the industry’s 
exponential growth in recent years.158 In its letter to the U.S. Courts’ 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Committee, the Chamber urged 
for change on the basis that third-party litigation is currently able to skirt the 
ethical boundaries of the law due to a lack of regulators and disclosure 
regulations.159 Its request argued that the current system creates an inherent 
conflict of interest by concealing the “real party . . . interest[s] that may be 
steering a plaintiff’s litigation strategy and settlement decisions.”160 
 
 155. SIMON & HYLAND, supra note 5, at 1420. 
 156. Alison Frankel, Business Lobby Calls for Federal Rules To Require Litigation Funding Disclosure, 
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The Chamber is not the only institution attempting to initiate change to 
the regulation of litigation finance. In February of 2019, U.S. Senators Chuck 
Grassley (Iowa), John Cornyn (Texas), Ben Sasse (Nebraska), and Thom Tillis 
(North Carolina) reintroduced a bill which would require disclosure of third-
party litigation financing.161 The Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2019 
would require disclosure of “the identity of any commercial enterprise, other 
than a class member or class counsel of record, that has a right to receive 
payment that is contingent on the receipt of monetary relief . . . by settlement, 
judgment, or otherwise.”162 Senator Grassley’s proposal would require only the 
disclosure of third-party funding for class action and multidistrict litigation.163 
Both proposals seem to advance the notion that increased transparency would 
allow clients to see who is pulling the strings behind the curtain and ultimately 
avoid any possible influence from a party operating outside of the actual 
proceeding. Although the proposed bill’s reform efforts do not encompass the 
full scope sought by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the underlying reasons 
for Senator Grassley’s suggested reformation parallel those driving the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce in its efforts for litigation-finance reform.164 
Senator Grassley and the Chamber emphasize another reason in their 
requests for the disclosure of third-party funding arrangements: the total lack 
of regulation of the industry.165 It is indisputable that litigation-financing 
arrangements constitute some form of an investment product. Funders supply 
capital to lawyers with an expectation of taking a portion of the profits and 
generating large returns.166 Yet, these arrangements are not regulated the same 
as comparably structured investments.167 At a minimum, modern funding 
arrangements should be subject to some form of financial regulation. 
C. An Overlooked Method of Regulation 
Classifying third-party funding as a security is one potential mechanism 
for regulatory oversight. The Securities Act of 1933 defines what constitutes a 
security168: “any note, stock, treasury stock, . . . or participation in any profit-
 
 161. Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2019, S. 471, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See Grassley, Tillis, Cornyn Introduce Bill To Shine Light on Third Party Litigation Financing 
Agreements, CHUCK GRASSLEY (May 10, 2018), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-
releases/grassley-tillis-cornyn-introduce-bill-shine-light-third-party-litigation 
[https://perma.cc/6SXC-P9XB] (“[L]itigation funding agreements have secretly funneled money into 
our civil justice system, all for the purpose of profiting off someone else’s case.”). 
 165. Compare id. (“Third party litigation funding . . . is largely unregulated and subject to little 
oversight.”), with Letter from Lisa A. Rickard to Rebecca A. Womeldorf, supra note 159 (“Absent 
robust disclosure requirements, TPLF will continue to operate in the shadows.”). 
 166. See Randazzo, Investors, supra note 78. 
 167. See infra Section III.C.  
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 973 (2020) 
2020] A GREAT & PROFITABLE CLAUSE 993 
sharing agreement . . . .”169 Although there has been some disagreement as to 
whether litigation funding should be classified as a loan or equity 
arrangement,170 the language of the Act should presumably apply to either 
classification. Because these new-age funding arrangements constitute some 
type of profit sharing, the statutory provision appears to apply to any practical 
interpretation of litigation finance. 
To date, there has been little to no consensus as to whether litigation 
funding should constitute a security under the Act. However, when comparing 
the statutory construction of profit sharing to other terms from the Act, there 
is a clear argument that these agreements should be presumed to be securities 
unless proven otherwise. In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,171 the Supreme 
Court held that “the plain meaning of the statutory definition mandates that 
the stock be treated as ‘securities’ subject to the coverage of the Acts.”172 Under 
its interpretation in Landreth, the Court ruled that investment instruments, 
which are explicitly stated in the definition of a security and conform with the 
usual characteristics of the instrument, are the “clearest case for coverage by the 
plain language of the definition.”173 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court expanded on this idea in Reves v. 
Ernst & Young.174 In Reves, the Supreme Court determined that “because the 
Securities Acts define ‘security’ to include ‘any note,’ we begin with a 
presumption that every note is a security.”175 The Court established that this 
presumption is rebuttable only by using the four “family resemblance” factors176 
to compare the note against a carefully enumerated list of notes that do not 
constitute securities.177 The first factor looks to the buyer and seller’s 
motivations underlying the transaction; the second factor examines the plan of 
distribution for the note; the third factor analyzes the reasonable expectations 
of the public investing in the note; while the fourth factor considers whether 
there is an alternative regulatory structure in place to govern the note if it is not 
considered a security.178 In other words, since the statutory language provides 
 
 169. Id. (emphasis added). 
 170. See infra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
 171. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). 
 172. Id. at 687. 
 173. See id. at 693. 
 174. 494 U.S. 56, 62–63 (1990). 
 175. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
 176. See id. at 66–67. 
 177. See id. at 65 (establishing the list of nonsecurity notes, including “the note delivered in 
consumer financing, . . . the note secured by a mortgage on a home, . . . the short-term note secured 
by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, . . . the note evidencing a ‘character’ loan to a bank 
customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply 
formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business” (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank 
of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976))). 
 178. Id. at 66–67.  
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for “any note,” the Court reasoned that all notes should be considered securities 
except for a very small carve out of investment instruments. These investment 
instruments technically may be called notes, but—when analyzed under the 
family resemblance factors—they are actually more analogous to notes that have 
been expressly excluded from being classified as securities as they are notes only 
in title.179 Because the Act explicitly provides the same statutory language for 
“any profit-sharing agreement,”180—until proven otherwise—the presumption 
established in Reves should seemingly be extended to all profit-sharing 
arrangements unless the arrangement is sufficiently shown to be a profit-sharing 
agreement in title only. 
Although modern litigation funding inherently involves some level of 
profit sharing, the dispute between investors and judiciaries181 over the most 
applicable investment structure opens the door for the possibility of 
circumventing the profit-sharing presumption. If, and only if, litigation 
financiers are able to sufficiently convince the judiciary that their modern 
funding arrangements are able to overcome this significant presumption, they 
likely face yet another hurdle in regard to securities regulation.182 Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, “investment contract[s]” are also considered securities.183 
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,184 the Supreme Court defined an investment contract 
as any “transaction . . . whereby a person invests his money in a common 
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or 
a third party.”185 With this definition, the Court ultimately created another 
four-element test used to classify investment products as securities.186 Since the 
inception of this definition, investment contracts have served as the catchall for 
establishing securities by allowing for the inclusion of unique investment 
opportunities not explicitly stated in the definition of a “security” under the 
Act.187 
Of the four investment contract elements defined in Howey, litigation 
finance arrangements appear to clearly satisfy two of the elements, but the other 
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two are less definitive. Because a funder contributing money to a lawyer has 
clearly invested money with an expectation of profits, whether third-party 
litigation financing should be considered an investment contract depends on if 
such arrangements form a common enterprise and if the funder’s expectation of 
earning profits is based solely on the efforts of others. Currently, there is a 
circuit split as to whether horizontal commonality188 or vertical commonality189 
is the sufficient standard for establishing a common enterprise.190 
However, in determining whether litigation funding arrangements should 
be considered investment contracts, more attention should be placed on the 
“efforts of others” element. Determining whether the expectation of profits is 
dependent solely on the efforts of others requires examining the transaction 
realistically but not literally.191 The predominant test is “whether the efforts 
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those 
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the 
enterprise.”192 When applying this test to litigation finance arrangements, 
nonlawyer funders are placed in a no-win situation. On the one hand, funders 
can argue the success of the investment is based solely on the effort of the lawyer 
or law firm. Under this argument, the financing arrangements would move 
closer to requiring regulation as a security. On the other hand, funders could 
argue their efforts help to dictate the outcome of the investment agreement 
because their capital contributions provide necessary financial resources for the 
proceedings. However, if funders attempt to make this argument, they would 
be openly acknowledging their expectation to control a litigation proceeding as 
a third party, thus exerting the exact influences prohibited by Rule 5.4(a) of the 
Professional Rules of Conduct. 
IV.  ADDRESSING CRITICISM BY FUNDERS TO THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 
ASSOCIATION 
There have been many critics of the NYCBA’s recent condemnation of 
third-party funding through portfolio investments. Quite literally, investors 
have hundreds of millions of dollars invested in the practice, so it makes sense 
that they would react negatively to an advisory opinion opposing their 
 
 188. See James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. 
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 189. In contrast, vertical commonality can be established so long as there is commonality between 
the investor and promoter regardless of whether there are multiple investors. Hector v. Wiens, 533 
F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 190. See generally Brodt v. Bache, 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing the differences between 
different circuits’ interpretations to the commonality requirement). 
 191. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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interests.193 The root of these objections stems from the belief that a lawyer who 
engages in receiving funds through this new-age financing does not sacrifice 
any more freedom than a lawyer who borrows funds using a traditional recourse 
loan.194 Because the rule against fee sharing between a lawyer and nonlawyer 
predates the practice of commercial litigation funding, modern investors feel 
that the prohibition is antiquated and baseless.195 While it is completely possible 
to debate the merits of the NYCBA’s advisory opinion on certain grounds,196 
many of the self-interested responses from these investors fail to account for 
the modern progression of commercial litigation funding. 
A. How Funders Have Improperly Characterized Financing Agreements 
Investors primarily object to the recent ethics opinion’s sharp contrast 
between the permissibility of recourse-funding arrangements and the 
impermissibility of non-recourse lending.197 The basis for this disagreement 
comes from the longstanding belief that funders consider present-day litigation 
funding to be a purchase of equity in the result of litigation rather than a loan.198 
To these funders, traditional recourse loans are seen to exert a greater influence 
on lawyers and litigation because of the high-interest rates accompanying these 
transactions. For instance, in Hamilton Capital VII, LLC, I v. Khorrami, LLP,199 
a law firm entered into a traditional recourse loan where it received $6 million 
secured by the firm’s property.200 Within five years and after defaulting on the 
loan, the firm had accrued an additional $2 million in interest fees.201 The 
funders opposing Opinion 2018-5 by the NYCBA have claimed “[it] is difficult 
to understand how . . . a high-interest loan . . . would have less impact on that 
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law firm’s independence on that matter than a non-recourse loan, which limits 
the lender’s recovery to assets only where the firm is successful.”202 
While this argument may have been appropriate in the early days of 
commercial litigation funding, these critics seemingly fail to account for the size 
and expansion of the industry in today’s society. Third-party funding may be 
structured as an equity investment if the investments are limited; however, the 
modern practice operates on the expectation of returns as if the funds are 
advanced as a loan. In Echeverria v. Estate of Linder,203 Judge Warshawsky—in 
reference to the inherent nature of third-party funding—said: 
[I]t is ludicrous to consider this transaction anything else but a loan 
unless the court was to consider it legalized gambling. Is it a gamble to 
loan/invest money to a plaintiff in a Labor Law action where there is 
strict liability? I think not. In fact, it might be considered a “sure 
thing.”204 
This idea is indicative of what the practice has evolved into today. Rather than 
funding one-off cases with the hopes of receiving a profit, litigation-finance 
firms are staffing up with top lawyers who are tasked with using their experience 
and knowledge to filter through cases to find the “sure thing.”205 
In fact, when these former-lawyers-turned-investors succeed in their 
attempts to find the type of diamond-in-the-rough case, they can transform 
their efforts into a science of sorts. As previously mentioned, litigation-finance 
firms now implement algorithms based on the prior results of their funding 
ventures to scan thousands of court documents and compute the cases where 
they can solicit lawyers for the opportunity to invest with a high probability of 
success.206 The modern portfolio investment structure also ensures litigation 
finance firms find the “sure thing.” Although every case financed may not yield 
a favorable return, funding numerous cases within a single firm significantly 
decreases the risk associated with lending and makes the investment structure 
more analogous to a loan.  
B. The Inherent Influences in Modern Funding Arrangements 
Even if litigation finance is more analogous to a permissible recourse loan 
under Rule 5.4(a), the inherent influence exerted by third-party funders is still 
problematic for two reasons. First, the influx of capital provided to these cases 
is a form of manipulation in itself because the cases are selected with a 
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presumption of how the financing will dictate a favorable outcome for the firm. 
In other words, the funders’ superior knowledge of the legal system allows firms 
to purchase a theorized degree of control over the outcomes of their 
investments, as evidenced by one prominent litigation finance firm obtaining 
settlements in over 40% of the cases its portfolio financed207 and another firm 
readily acknowledging the barriers third-party funding places on a litigation 
proceeding.208 
The second form of influence is based on the continuing relationships 
formed between lawyers and funders under the current system. For all intents 
and purposes, third-party funding is a good deal for the funder and the lawyers 
receiving the capital. Funders are generating large returns with a high 
probability of success, and the lawyers or law firms are able to operate without 
the risk of loss. The current portfolio-funding system, where third-party 
financers provide funds to be used across multiple cases, is based on continued 
success between these two parties. As lawyers perform, they are rewarded with 
more and more capital to use in their pursuits of more litigation.209 These 
continuous funding arrangements, backed by unprecedented amounts money, 
indisputably create a loyalty between funder and lawyer, because the lawyer 
would like to continue operating risk free. As these relationships grow, the 
likelihood that lawyers will act in a manner inconsistent with their client’s best 
interest becomes greater and greater. Both forms of influence provide funders 
with the opportunity to control or manipulate the outcome of cases, the exact 
type of behavior that the rules prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and 
nonlawyers are intended to prevent. 
CONCLUSION 
Third-party funding is not a new practice but, in fact, has been around for 
centuries. The NYCBA has not condemned the practice of lawyers receiving 
money from third parties to finance their cases. Rather, its recent ethics opinion 
is centered around very specific commercial litigation-funding arrangements. 
The opinion found that when funders and lawyers enter into contingent fee-
sharing agreements, where a funder’s recovery is to be determined on the 
outcome of a single case or multiple cases, the funder has an inherent incentive 
or ability to exert influence over the lawyer to the detriment of the lawyer’s 
client. 
The parties who seem to be the most condemning of the NYCBA’s recent 
ethics opinion are those who are heavily invested in the practice of litigation 
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financing. They argue that third-party financing is a wholly ethical practice that 
has become a staple of American litigation because it provides greater freedom 
and access to litigation for all. In addition to the belief that litigation funding 
should be permissible within the scope of Rule 5.4(a), the proponents of 
litigation funding also argue that third-party funding is neither a loan subject 
to usury regulations nor a profit-sharing or investment contract subject to 
securities regulation. Under the contemporary system of litigation financing, 
the pseudo lawyer/investment analyst is able to manipulate this lack of 
regulatory interference to generate large profits at a high probability. In a sense, 
the modern-day funder uses previous knowledge, experience, and relationships 
to improperly interfere with litigation in the United States legal system. 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the NYCBA, it is indisputable that 
litigation finance has evolved into a new, “mainstream”210 form and is rapidly 
having a larger and larger effect on the American legal system. Because of the 
industry’s origins and self-governing progression, third-party funders have 
generated massive returns without encountering much regulatory oversight. As 
the investing practice continues to experience rapid growth, it is possible that 
an agency such as the SEC will take over regulation; however, the rule 
prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers has been one of the 
only checks on the industry—and in some cases has gone largely ignored. The 
NYCBA openly admitted that its advisory opinion might have surpassed the 
scope of the original rule prohibiting fee sharing; however, it also recognized 
the deceptive and deceitful dangers underlying contingent funding 
arrangements. In light of the modern reform efforts to control third-party 
funding, it is entirely possible that the bar association was attempting to use its 
only available means to limit the extreme profits resulting from this misleading 
practice. 
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